Once the stuff of conspiracy theories, media speculation has grown in recent weeks that COVID-19 may have originated in an insufficiently secured virology lab. While the accidental or intentional leak of a dangerous pathogen is by no means impossible, a rigid set of internationally recognized standards play a major part in making this nightmare scenario unlikely. If anything, the COVID-19 outbreak has reinforced a point seared on the minds of all scientists and researchers at the start of their careers: lab security matters at all times.

Risky Business

Whether manmade or naturally occurring, viruses are commonplace in research laboratories around the world. In the case of the former, many scientists are capable of creating an artificial virus through genetic modification. These include adenoviruses, lentiviruses and others used for gene delivery in mammalian cell cultures and in vivo. Viruses often play a role in gene therapy research. Involving the insertion of genes into the genome for therapeutic aims, this practice requires the transfer of genes to the nucleus of cells. In this respect, viruses serve as one of the best vectors for making these transfers happen.

Using viruses in clinical trials is not without its drawbacks. Despite offering high in vivo transfection efficiency and sustained gene expression, working with viruses under clinical trial conditions has – in addition to therapeutic advantage – potentially serious implications for immunogenicity and cytotoxicity. A lab user whose health has been compromised by working with viruses should expect to enter isolation and receive round-the-clock monitoring of their symptoms. From there, the release of a virus on an unwitting public could lead to widespread transmission affecting many more people than those exposed in a particular laboratory.

In this respect, the current global situation offers a glimpse of the potential unease caused – and likely government response – to the spread of a lab-made virus combining, say, the highly virulent H5N1 avian flu and seasonal human influenza. The same rule of thumb also applies to the 2005 synthesis of the 1918 ‘Spanish flu,’ the deadly pandemic-causing virus regularly mentioned in the same breath as COVID-19. Left unchecked, virus research poses a potentially serious risk to both occupational and public health.

Standards and Ethics

For these two reasons alone, access to virology research laboratories is extremely restricted and controlled. It is also important that lab users learn safe handling of viruses, viral production, maintenance of infectivity, and storage of viruses. As things stand, international standard virology research is conducted under Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) conditions. BSL3 requires lab users to wear protective clothing, including the doubling of lab coats, gloves and glasses. Researchers must also work with virus‐containing tubes within biological hoods and centrifuge the virus in sealed tubes. Liquid and solid waste should be either poured into bleach containers or autoclaved.

In addition to the above general international standards, additional specific requirements such as incident response procedures or medical surveillance should be added for persons engaged in certain types of biological research. This includes the collection of pre-assignment serum as well as routine periodic specimens. If illness occurs which may be related to the agent the person is working with, additional serum samples will be collected. In certain situations personnel engaged in particular research activities will be immunized with appropriate vaccines, such as rabies, rubella and measles. Other specific restrictions or recommendations could be made on an individual basis after discussion with the Employee Health Physician.

Beyond stringent biosafety measures it’s important that all scientists abide by a set of bioethical principles applied to research involving viruses and other pathogens. These are encapsulated in documents like the Belmont Report, which particularly highlights the importance of beneficence. The report states that scientists are morally obliged to weigh the benefits of research investigation against potential risks to human health and safety.

Similarly, the Interacademy Panel on International Issues’ Statement on Biosecurity emphasizes that scientists should strive to do no harm and take into account the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their research activities. This statement was approved by 74 national academies of science, presumably demonstrating widespread agreement to the extension of beneficence and risk assessment to non-human research subjects, including viruses.

The United States currently takes an even more cautious approach to virology research. Back in 2014, the Obama administration suspended government funding for experiments that enhance the mammalian virulence or transmissibility of influenza, as well as the SARS and MERS viruses. This decision represented a major development in discourse concerning the creation of viruses that combine genetic novelty with efficient transmissibility in humans.

It’s also possible that policymakers were influenced by Science and Nature magazines’ decision to publish two articles describing the creation of ferret-transmissible strains of influenza. In both instances, the main concern was that publishing results could inspire malevolent individuals, groups or states to try to weaponize dangerous viruses. Such fears also resonate with global discussions concerning the dual-use dilemma, in which one and the same piece of scientific research can both help or harm humanity.

No Time like the Present

COVID-19 will dominate the global agenda for the foreseeable future. News reports, treatment options, government data, and more will be continuously poured over by groups and individuals determined to read between the lines for content that fits their agendas. In a world where information is easily distorted, it’s important that organizations tackling COVID-19 have the ability to rapidly counter spurious narratives with hard facts. This includes the global scientific community, which can demonstrate that its adherence to stringent lab security measures predates the current situation.

Dr. Mustapha Aouida is a research scientist and lab manager at the College of Health and Life Sciences (CHLS) at Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU).

Dr. Dindial Ramotar is a professor at CHLS at HBKU.

Dr. Edward Stuenkel is Founding Dean of the College of Health and Life Sciences.

This article is submitted on behalf of the author by the HBKU Communications Directorate. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the University’s official stance.


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